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Abstract 
RACHEL BEERMAN: Democratization in the Southern Neighbourhood: Noble 
Declarations, Unavoidable Dilemmas? 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova, Don Searing, and John Stephens) 
Much of the literature describes the EU’s policy towards its southern Neighbouring region, in 
particular its reluctance to promote democracy more assertively, to be driven by a quest for 
stability and a preference for the status quo. While this is true to a certain degree, it does not 
account for the EU’s persistent attempts to improve the effectiveness and influence of its 
democracy promotion policies.  Rather, this thesis understands the status quo orientation of 
EU’s Mediterranean policies to be concomitant to the stability-democratization dilemma in a 
region where opening up the political space is seen to present a crucial challenge to European 
short-term stability interests. The Union’s reluctance to promote democracy more seriously 
in its southern Neighbourhood is therefore explained in relation to the incompatibility of the 
EU to reconcile its long-term security strategy with its short-term security interests. 
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 Introduction 
During the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has established itself as an 
agent of international democracy promotion in its neighbourhood. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which the EU designed as an institutional framework for 
developing ‘privileged relations’ and managing cooperation with the non-candidate 
neighbouring countries of the enlarged EU in Eastern Europe, North Africa the Middle East 
and the Southern Caucasus, is the primary framework through which European democracy 
promotion in these regions currently occurs. The ENP proclaims shared values to be the basis 
of neighbourhood cooperation ENP strategy documents and national action plans tie both 
participation in the ENP in itself and the intensity of and level of cooperation to the ENP 
partners’ commitment and adherence to these shared values (Commission, 2004). On paper, 
at least, the ENP places far more emphasis on democracy, human rights and sustainable 
development promotion as compared with previous initiative such as the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP). In practice, however, it is up to the partner countries to determine 
whether, and to what extent they will cooperate with the EU on promoting democracy, 
human rights or the rule of law. Moreover, non-cooperation does not preclude intense 
cooperation in other sectoral policy areas, such as the environment, trade or migration 
(Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 887).  
There is broad agreement in the literature not only on the overall inconsistency of EU 
strategy, but also on the overall low impact of the EU on democracy and human rights in 
non-candidate third countries (Schimmelfennig 2005; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011). 
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Indeed, the EU has been criticized for prioritizing security concerns and Union interests at 
the expense of democracy and its promotion in its relations with ENP Mediterranean partner 
states. The revolts in the Arab world that swept across the Middle East and North Africa in 
early 2011 confirmed this overall assessment. As recognized by EU leaders themselves, the 
‘Arab Spring’ calls into fundamental question EU policy towards the region (Tocci, 2011). 
As put by Stefan Füle (2011), European Commissioner for Enlargement and the ENP:   We	  must	  show	  humility	  about	  the	  past.	  Europe	  was	  not	  vocal	  enough	  in	  defending	  human	  rights	  and	  local	  democratic	  forces	  in	  the	  region.	  Too	  many	  of	  us	  fell	  prey	  to	  the	   assumption	   that	   authoritarian	   regimes	   were	   a	   guarantee	   of	   stability	   in	   the	  region.	  This	  was	  not	  even	  Realpolitik.	  It	  was,	  at	  best,	  short-­‐termism	  –	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  short-­‐termism	  that	  makes	  the	  long-­‐term	  ever	  more	  difficult	  to	  build.1	  
 
Over the past year, the shortcomings within the EU’s security policy towards its 
southern Neighbourhood have dramatically come to light. The popular uprisings that swept 
across the EU’s southern Neighbourhood in early 2011 certainly gave greater impetus to the 
then-ongoing internal review of the ENP, prompting a serious re-think of the EU’s hierarchy 
of policy priorities and of the manner in which such policies have been carried out (Tocci & 
Cassarino, 2011) – namely, through a very gradual, soft top-down approach to 
democratization based on processes of socialization through partnership-building and the 
limited use of positive conditionality (Andrés Viñas, 2009).  
This paper asks two central questions: What drives EU policy? And do the recent 
reforms proposed in light of the May 2011 policy review change this scenario? The 
mainstream view holds that the EU’s Mediterranean policies, and the ENP in particular, are 
premised on the democratic peace theory (Menendez Gonzalez, 2005, p.15). Advocates of 
this perspective argue that democracy was – and may still be – seen by policy-makers as a 
                                                
1 S. Fule, 2011, Speech on the recent events in North Africa, 11/130, 28 February 2011.  
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means of guaranteeing long-term security of the EU’s citizens. Indeed, the EU routinely and 
even ritually claims that it sees firm support for democratization as part of its geostrategic 
calculus. Notwithstanding the Union’s normative rhetoric that points to such a nexus, in 
practice, there has been substantial unwillingness to exert his kind of influence (Eder, 2011, 
p. 442). Much of the literature describes the EU’s policy towards its southern Neighbouring 
region – in particular, its unwillingness to promote democracy more assertively – to be 
driven by a quest for stability and a preference for the status quo (Holm, 2008; Powel, 2009). 
While this is true to a certain degree (Eder, 2011), it does not account for the EU’s persistent 
attempts to improve the effectiveness of its democracy and human rights promotion policies.  
Rather, this thesis understands the status quo orientation of EU’s Mediterranean policies to 
be concomitant to the stability-democratization dilemma in a region that is seen to present 
direct security threats to European interests, and opening up the political process would be 
tantamount to destabilization.  This thesis argues that the logic is not quite one of ‘security 
through democracy’. Rather, it might best be captured by what Youngs (2010) describes: 
‘security alongside democracy, when other conditions are fulfilled’ (p.2). When these two 
objectives conflict, the EU systematically prioritizes short-term stability over the longer-term 
goal of democratization.  
This thesis draws on country case studies from Morocco and Tunisia in order to 
analyze the specific dynamics of the stability-democracy dilemma across three priority areas 
of ENP security cooperation. Both of the countries analyzed are considered an important 
partner for the EU with respect to its security agenda; yet they differ in terms of the particular 
area(s) of security cooperation that are prioritized. In addition they differ in the degree of 
authoritarianism, with Morocco being partly free and Tunisia being unfree, according to the 
 4 
two most influential international indices.2   The different-case-comparison can be further 
justified with the relative importance of the EU in the two countries’ foreign policy agenda 
and, thus, with the different types of interdependence with the EU.   Finally, the two 
countries have had distinct ‘Arab Spring’ experiences, with Tunisia having experience a 
revolution and Morocco having at least rhetorically, stepped up commitment to reform.  
The thesis is structured as follows. Based on a brief analysis of the democratic peace 
theory, the first section develops the ‘stability-democratization dilemma’ concept and offers 
several interpretations on how the conflict between democracy promotion and stability 
interact.  It will be argued that contradictory security concerns, conceptualized as a stability-
democracy dilemma, are the key factor explaining the EU’s ambiguous approach to 
democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. Section two identifies the various geostrategic 
interests that may be expected to cut across democracy support in each of the three country 
case studies.   The third section considers security-democracy nexus across three areas of 
security concern – interstate relations, soft security, counter-terrorism.3 For each area of 
security concern, it examines the EU’s strategic logic and approach to the security-
democracy link in three separate policies – Political reform (democracy promotion itself), 
Migration and Counter-Terrorism – and how these competing interests interact to produce a 
‘stability-democratization dilemma’ in European policy. Section four then assesses the extent 
to which these dynamics have been changed since the Arab Spring and subsequent ENP 
rethink.  
                                                
2 See http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/16.0.html?&L=1 and http://www.freedomhouse.org;  
3 There is a fourth strategic logic in the area of ‘Conflict Prevention/Regional stability’, however this security 
concern is not considered here for reasons of space and relevance to the cases.  
 I. Theoretical Framework: Why Democracy? 
The purpose of this section is to introduce and examine alternate theories about what 
drives EU democracy and security policies towards its Mediterranean partner countries in the 
ENP. Based on a brief analysis of the democratic peace theory, the section considers the link 
between democracy and security in the EU’s Mediterranean policy. In then introduces the 
‘stability-democratization dilemma’ concept and offers several interpretations on how the 
conflict between democracy promotion and stability interact to produce the dilemma.    
The Democracy-Security Link 
The conviction is well-established among policy-makers that a more democratic 
world would in general terms be a more peaceable and prosperous one, as peaceable relations 
and security objectives are more likely to be achieved with states whose governments are 
open, accountable, predictable and transparent (Youngs, 2010, p. 2). This is the essence of 
the democratic peace theory. The argument is that, by promoting democracy in the 
Mediterranean, “the EU is able to address the root causes of the ‘soft’ security threats 
emanating from the region, and thereby enhance the EU’s own security in the long run” 
(Andrés Viñas, 2010, p. 8).  According to this logic, democratization is not itself an 
objective, but rather is a means through which the EU promotes its own security. Hence, 
Andrés Viñas concludes, “where democracy and security appear as conflicting interests, 
security will take precedence” (ibid.). 
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Despite the democracy’s alleged role as a means for achieving Europe’s long-term 
security objectives, the promotion of democracy is increasingly seen by EU policy-makers as 
a destabilizing factor that endanger European security interests in short-term (Eder, 2011). As 
such, the problems of instability associated with democratic transition are perceived to 
crucially challenge European short-term interests (Andrés Viñas, p. 8). This conflict between 
the promotion of democracy and short-term stability is the prevailing interpretation amongst 
scholars of the inconsistencies in the EU’s Mediterranean policy. 
Thesis Statement: Democratization-Stability Dilemma 
Indeed, much of the literature describes the EU’s policy in the southern Neighbouring 
region as being “driven by a quest for stability and a desire to maintain the status quo” (Eder, 
2011, p. 432). According to Franz Eder (2011), however, the status quo orientation so often 
associated with the EU’s Mediterranean policies is “not only the result of this ‘stability 
syndrome’ but also a consequence of economic and energy interests on the domestic and 
international level” together with a “fear of regional destabilisation” (p. 432). This view 
supported by Andrés Viñas who further suggests that scholars advocating the ‘stability-
democratization dilemma’ approach “seem to implicitly conceptualize the dilemma in terms 
of a static conflict between realist notions of security cooperation and normative 
democratization goals” (2009, p. 10).  
This is true to a certain degree. However this thesis takes the view proposed by 
Andrés Viñas, which understands the dilemma in to be “a balancing act between two 
conflicting security logics, with a simultaneous presence and intermingling of the two logics 
at a discursive level (Malmvig, 2004), but with a clear prioritization at a policy level” (2009, 
p. 10). Specifically, democracy is, indeed, understood as the best way of ensuring long-term 
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security for EU’s citizens. However, considering the perceived risks associated with a rapid 
transition to democracy, foremost of which include domestic and/or regional destabilization 
or the coming to power of regimes hostile to European interests, democratization is portrayed 
as a gradual, long-term project (ibid). Stability, therefore, is to be preserved as the best means 
to achieve short-term security. From this perspective, security cooperation with incumbent 
regimes on matters of immigration and counter-terrorism policy is necessary and practical 
(ibid, p. 10).  
In the ENP framework in particular, it is argued that these two notions of security are 
in constant competition and at times highly incompatible with one another. This stability-
democracy dilemma is identified as the main factor explaining the EU’s ambiguous and often 
inconsistent policies of democracy promotion in the Mediterranean ENP states (Viñas, 2010), 
as well as the resulting focus on short-term, status-quo oriented security strategies.  
 
 II. Intervening Factors and Conflicting Interests 
A number of geopolitical factors increasingly work against democracy support more 
than they have encouraged the EU to focus on democracy more diligently. This section 
considers the impact of geopolitics and identifies the particular geostrategic interests that 
have undermined the focus on support for democracy  – or that alternatively have enhanced 
its promotion – in the two country case studies. First, the state of democracy and the main 
legislative and political barriers to reform in each respective state is briefly summarized.  
State of Democracy 
In respect of the state of democracy, overall trends have been disappointing in both 
cases.4 In Morocco, political life is characterized by a ‘constant double reality’, whereby 
“[f]ormally democratic structures and institutions mask an informal shadow governance 
structure” (Kausch, 2008, p. 10). Liberalism of Moroccan society has been quite considerable 
in a regional perspective, yet the palace and Makhzen5 remain gatekeepers of the reform 
process. Thus a process of modernizing and partly liberalizing has not entailed 
democratization. In Tunisia, on the other hand, despite the country’s impressive socio-
economic development and achievement, especially when compared with the regional as a 
whole, this has not been accompanied by any meaningful progress in the political sphere - 
                                                
4 It should be noted that the discussion of democratization and the state of reform throughout this section refers 
only to the pre-Arab Spring time period (i,e, up until January 2011). 
 
5 The Makhzen is the network of the palace and its clients that dictates the main lines of policy and acts as a 
gatekeeper for any kind of political reform. 
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what is often described as the ‘Tunisian Paradox’ (Kausch, 2009, p.2-3). Rather, for years the 
country has been characterized by one party rule6 and a total repression of the opposition 
(ibid.). Finally, opposition parties are not permitted and the popular Islamist party remains 
outlawed. 
Geopolitical Factors  
"While the democratization agenda gained greater momentum and support as part of 
the anti-terrorism agenda security strategy in the MENA region following 9/11, it is now 
losing force as a driver of EU security policy (Kausch, 2008; Youngs, 2010). In the case of 
EU-Morocco relations, for reasons of geographical proximity and common interests, issues 
of migration, free trade and regional security are of considerable European interest (Kausch, 
2008).  With the Moroccan coast visible over the Straits of Gibraltar, migration in particular 
has become a top priority in EU-Moroccan cooperation. For Europe, and Spain and France in 
particular7, the most pressing interests in this regard include management of border controls 
and the speedy finalization of negotiations on a readmission agreement (ibid. p. 13). On the 
Moroccan side, and due to increasing strain as a transit country for migrants from the South, 
policy-makers call for greater European assistance for border controls and a lowering of the 
barrier for legal work migration.  Notably, however, as Kausch points out, given the higher 
stakes involved, “the two EU states most influential in Morocco are also the two least 
inclined to promote democratic reform” (ibid.).  
 Regional security is another pressing issue of European interest, which also 
frequently clashes with democracy policies (ibid.) Against the background of an increasingly 
                                                
6 Tunisia is led by President Zine ben Ali of the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party (1985-
2011). 
 
7 Due to stronger ties and common interests stemming from geographical proximity, France and Spain generally 
take the lead when it comes to steering Europe’s agenda towards Morocco. 
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unstable regional environment – most notably entailing regional conflict, transnational 
terrorist networks, trafficking of human beings and organized crime – the Moroccan 
government is supported as a stabilizing ally in the region and a key partner in the fight 
against terrorism. For these reasons, among others, Europeans “are disinclined to jeopardize 
this for the sake of ‘optimising’ Moroccan democratic standard” (ibid. 13).  
Turning to Tunisia, it has been argued that, at least on paper, the country appears to 
be the best potential for democratization in the MENA in which case one would assume that 
the impact of external forces in pressuring the leadership to democratize would make a 
considerable difference in pressuring the authoritarian regime to democratize and promoting 
plurality (Durac et al., 2009, p.13). A number of advantages in particular are worth 
mentioning. First, compared to the other countries in the region, Tunisia has no significant 
radical Islamist opposition; enjoys a rather significant degree of economic success; lacks any 
significant natural resources (which serves to decrease its strategic value); is integrated in the 
global economy and has strong trade links with the EU.8  For these reasons, it is argued, 
Tunisia would be the perfect ‘target country’ on which to attempt to export democracy and 
apply pressure for change (ibid, p. 14).  
Such favorable conditions notwithstanding, Europeans have been reluctant to exercise 
any of its massive economic leverage in Tunisia and jeopardize the cooperative stance of the 
Tunisian regime towards European efforts in other areas of EU (security) interest – in 
particular, trade and economic relations. In addition, the EU supports Tunisia as a valuable 
ally in the fight against terrorism and an “island of stability in the troubled waters of the 
Southern Mediterranean” (Kausch, 2009, p. 3). As in Morocco, it is not considered in 
                                                
8 The EU is Tunisia's principal trading partner, accounting for 74% of both Tunisia's exports and imports, or 
€18.4 billion in monetary terms (Commission,2007. Bilateral trade relations: Tunisia), providing the Union with 
potentially considerable leverage over Tunis (Powel, 2009b, p.65). 
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Europe’s interest to put this status quo in danger for sake of ‘optimising’ Tunisia’s 
democratic standards In many ways, it is argued, Tunisia illustrates the contradictions that 
are at the heart of the foreign and security policies of both actors in the region (Durac et al., 
2009).  
 III. Democracy-Security Nexus in the ENP Framework 
Using Richard Youngs’ (2010) classification of the EU’s approach to the security-
democracy link in its relations with third countries’, the security-democracy nexus can be 
broken down into four separate strategic logics.  In each area of security concern – interstate 
relations, soft security, counter-terrorism and conflict resolution – democracy’s value is a 
hotly debated topic. The case studies below present first the strategic logic linking democracy 
and security in the three areas of security concern analyzed in this thesis9. In all three, is 
shown that, in its Southern Neighbourhood, the EU is driven by what Richard Youngs 
describes to be “a security agenda that is judged to be best served by a stabilizing 
liberalization of still-autocratic regimes, in a context in which conditionality is judged neither 
feasible nor desirable” (Youngs, 2009, p. 913). It then assesses how the two goals interact to 
produce a stability-democracy dilemma in which short-term stability is systematically 
prioritized in such a way that reinforces the status quo to the detriment of genuine long-term 
democratization.  
Integrative vs. democratic dynamics in inter-state relations 
The first proposition essentially restates the democratic peace theory. It holds that the 
EU is likely to be able to establish more peaceable relations with democratic than with 
autocratic regimes, and thus security aims are more likely to be achieved with states whose 
governments are open, accountable, predictable and transparent (Youngs, 2010, p. 2). While 
                                                
9 The strategic logic for conflict prevention and peace-building is not discussed in this thesis for reasons of 
space and relevance to the  case studies. 
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it may be true that the EU prefers that democracy prevail in its relations with third countries 
– especially in those states presenting Europe with its ‘thorniest strategic challenges’, 
Youngs argues “democracy is not prioritized as the means of improving relations with other 
powers. Rather, policy focuses on other means of addressing those challenges, with 
democracy an apparently marginally-contributing long-term goal” (p. 2).  While not 
completely absent, “democracy is supported as and when security aims in inter-state relations 
allow it” (ibid). When it comes to ‘states of concern,’ as Youngs describes them, the 
objective is to “integrate non-democratic regimes into interlocking dependent processes and 
structures that constrain their behavior. Interdependence is seen as a more potent security 
driver than democratization” (ibid.). It is about ‘locking them in’ rather than pressing 
democratic reform. This can be seen in the case of the ENP framework more generally, as 
well as the specific cases of Tunisia and Morocco.  
ENP Procedures: Built-In dilemma 
  To the extent that democracy is promoted in the European Neighbourhood, the EU’s 
approach is said to consist in the promotion of democratic governance.10 As such, the EU has 
chosen to pursue a very gradual, soft top-down approach to democracy promotion in the 
southern Mediterranean partner states based on processes of socialization through 
partnership-building and the limited use of positive (Andrés Viñas, 2009). Thus democracy is 
“supported through technocratic, functional cooperation because this is compatible with 
short-term, collective problem-solving on security matters.” (Youngs, 2010, p. 13). Such a 
                                                
10 The term democratic governance as defined by Freyburt et al., (2007) refers to an understanding of 
democracy defined according to its underlying principles rather than specific institutions embodying them. This 
approach to democratization “consists in the promotion of democratic governance norms through third 
countries’ approximation to EU sectoral policies, i.e., functional cooperation.” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 
2011, p.888). The principles are transparency, accountability, and participation. Democratic sectoral governance 
is achieved by incorporating these into administrative rules and practices within a non-democratic polity 
(Freyburg et al., 2009: 917).  
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strategy is coherent with the democratization-stability dilemma as it envisions a gradual 
process of political reforms eventually leading to democratization in the long-term, without 
jeopardizing short-term stability and hence, security. Quite problematic, however, as argued 
by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011), is that such an approach “does not necessarily 
address civil society actors, nor does it directly affect the overarching institutional 
arrangements of the polity” (p. 896). Therefore, “even if it is successful, democratic 
governance promotion may still occur within a generally semi-autocratic political system” 
(ibid), as in the case of Morocco.  This will be examined in the following sections.  
Negotiating & Devising the Action Plans  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze the individual AP provisions one by 
one, but suffice it to say that it is well documented in the literature that the APs with the 
southern Neighbours are poorly conceived, guided by ‘soft’ priorities that fail to address the 
most important political issues, and characterized by vague and elusive formulations of the 
AP provisions in general (Del Sarto et al., 2006; Del Sarto et al., 2011). What is of interest 
here is the clear predominance of geopolitical interests within and throughout these Action 
Plans, and how this impacts on the democratization agenda more generally.  
Comparing the APs negotiated with the two partners reveals an incoherent democracy 
promotion policy and the overriding importance of the EU’s geostrategic and partner 
countries’ political interests (Lavenex et al., 2011, p.899). The EU-Morocco Action Plan is a 
case in point. For one, the AP identifies a number of ambitious but selective reforms, which 
as Kausch (2008) argues, “indirectly follow the Moroccan ruling elite’s course of 
modernisation and selective political reforms in carefully chosen areas that do not touch on 
the distribution of powers” (p.9). Significantly, the systemic-level reforms that are a 
 15 
precondition for a representative democracy with a balance of power and the rule of law are 
omitted entirely.11 The ‘remaining collection of piecemeal political reform measures’ is not 
likely to contribute to a genuine democratization, as most of the preconditions for many of 
the measures to take practical effect are missing (ibid, p.17). This leads to the problematic 
fact that the EU’s assumption of socialization via gradual reform applies only to a certain 
extent in Morocco. As Kausch rightly posits, “…the accumulation of more or less connected 
ad hoc reforms is not automatically a process, let alone a transition to democracy” (ibid.). 
Even more problematic is that “by focusing on a collection of selective modernisation 
measures, rather than on a coherent strategy that includes the more delicate aspects of 
systemic level change previously identified as crucial by the Commission’s own assessment,” 
the AP priorities themselves indirectly support this flawed logic (ibid.). This structural gap is 
generally defended with reference to the “need for a “gradual” process and the 
“accumulative” effect selective reforms will have in the long run.” (ibid.).  However, instead 
of being the ‘gradual’ steps in a consistent, overarching process towards democracy, the 
proposed (and subsequently implemented) political reforms have tended to be ad hoc, 
selective and rather superficial (Del Sarto et al., 2006; Del Sarto et al., 2011; Kausch, 2008).  
As for the EU-Tunisia Action Plan, on the other hand, the document is not based on 
any domestically generated document of good intentions, and as a result, the section on 
‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’ is particularly superficial. It states the ‘strengthening [of] 
institutions and the judiciary’ as its objective. The AP is even more vague on matters of 
democracy, as Del Sarto et.al., (2006) note “the documents does not give evidence of a clear 
                                                
11 Measures identified under the chapters “democracy and the rule of law” and “human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” include capacity building in public administration, decentralisation, access to justice, modernisation 
of courts, prisons and legal procedures, support to implement the IER recommendations, adherence to and 
compliance with international conventions, combating corruption, strengthening dialogue on human rights, 
freedom of association and expression, women and children’s rights, and cultural and linguistic rights. 
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conceptualization of democracy and its key elements” (p. 34). Also noteworthy, and in line 
with the previous observation, is the fact that, not only does the Action Plan “keep silent 
about the nature of the political system,” it does “not even address the any of the most 
relevant issues” (Del Sarto et al., 2011, p. 941).  
ENP APs and Implementation  
The practical effect of including the competing logics embodied by the partnership 
and socialization principles is that the democratic governance model itself has been designed 
in way that is ‘relatively unthreatening to autocratic regimes’ (Young 2009, p. 910). This 
means that governments that have been resistant to embracing democratic norms – even at 
the rhetorical level – have continued to benefit from a range of European co-operation 
efforts. For example, Youngs states: Even	   in	   Morocco,	   the	   supposedly	   star	   reformer	   of	   the	   Middle	   East,	   on	   closer	  inspection	  most	   ‘reform’	   projects	   carried	   out	   under	   the	   label	   of	   supporting	   EU-­‐style	  regulatory	  and	  governance	  modernization	   in	   fact	   take	  the	   form	  of	   funds	  for	  equipment,	  new	  computers	  and	  buildings,	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  experience	  in	  how	  to	   make	   decision-­‐making	   more	   effective	   not	   necessarily	   more	   accountable	  (Kausch,	  2008;	  Khakee,	  2008,	  as	  cited	  in	  Youngs	  2009,	  p.	  910).	  	  
 
For the time being, as Kausch concludes “both discourse and action suggest that 
European policies towards Morocco do not aspire to back full political freedom and genuine 
democratization” (2008, p. 17). For instance, the 2006, 2008 and 2009 Morocco Progress 
Reports repeatedly mentioned persistent shortcomings and areas for improvement with 
respect to the Moroccan judicial and political systems. However, the absence of references to 
the need for the independence of the judiciary and legal accountability in EU documents 
suggests the reforms are expected to take place “within the boundaries of [the] current 
constitution and distribution of powers and very little else” (Kausch 2008, p.5). Such an 
approach to reform is reminiscent of what Youngs calls a strategy of “depressurizing 
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liberalization” (2009, p. 911) of the Moroccan regime which serves to stabilize the 
government while still ‘promoting’ the long-term goal of democratization through gradual 
political liberalization. 
By contrast, Tunisia under Ben Ali consistently denies the need for change and 
reform leading to more political liberalization (van Hullen, 2011, p.13). This was made clear 
in the very first Association Council meeting in 1998 with Tunisia threatening to discontinue 
talks altogether if the domestic human rights situation was to be discussed (Del Sarto et al., 
2011, p. 942). According to Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011), this attitude was an enduring 
feature of the attitude characterizing Tunisia’s position under Ben Ali, which also helps to 
explain the particularly empty political provisions in the EU-Tunisia AP (ibid.). 
Consequently, the democratization-stability dilemma in Tunisia manifests itself in a different 
way than in Morocco. Here, as Powel (2007) argues the importance placed on security and 
stability is the principle point of convergence between the policies of EU and Tunisia 
(p.207). It is precisely through this convergence that the interaction of stability and 
democratization plays out.  
For one, the impact of this convergence on the mechanisms and prospects of 
conditionality instruments is evidenced by the fact that the EU has not pushed for 
cooperation or attempted to apply some ‘leverage’ over Tunisia. Rather, it is said to limit it 
its cooperation to non-political areas in order to avoid confrontation Kausch et al., p. 973). 
Moreover, since the early 2000s, European aid to Tunisia has increased from around €70 
million a year to €100 million a year under the ENPI CSP 2010-201312. Moreover, any 
‘reform’ effort here entails support for the regime’s economic programmes (Kausch et al., 
                                                
12 See NIP 2007-2010 http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/dmdocuments/tunisia%20csp_nip_2007-
2013_en.pdf;  
and NIP 2005-2006 http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/dmdocuments/CSP/tunisie_nip05_06_en.pdf  
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2009, p. 973). Again, despite favorable conditions as a target for greater pressure for political 
liberalization, “EU diplomats define their goal as seeking to ‘construct an overall atmosphere 
of trust and confidence’” (ibid.). While the reasons are immediately clear, Powel (2007) 
argues that its discourse suggests a “deep-seated fear of anything that might challenge 
stability/encourage instability in its near neighbours. Security has slowly come to overwhelm 
its relations with Mediterranean neighbours" (p.210). From this perspective, it is not 
surprising that the Commission limits itself to praising the ‘impressive achievements’ of the 
Tunisian government in non-political areas such as health, education and gender equality. As 
a result, Kausch and Youngs believe the disconnect between the comparatively good and 
stable levels of economic and social development on the one hand, and the repressive 
political conditions on the other, “has led the Commission to greater passivity in the political 
field” (2009, p.973). 
In terms of socialization, the impact of this convergence on democratization is 
evident in the development of EU policy documents on Tunisia in recent years (Powel, 2007, 
p.207-208). More concretely, this refers to the pattern of leaving references to ‘democracy’ 
out of documents and off the meeting agendas, which over time puts into question the very 
mechanism by which democratization is supposed to engendered: i.e., socialization (ibid). In 
the Commission Communication on Strengthening the ENP (2006), for instance, the term 
‘democracy’ was dropped entirely, calling instead for better governance in the Union’s 
neighbourhood (Commission, 2006b). However as Powel (2007) continues, the very same 
document, however, “continues to stress the need for economic reform and security 
cooperation. Thus, the language used in the political and economic parts of the policy blur 
into one: ‘governance’ is used in both arts” (ibid, p. 209). In fact, this practice of leaving 
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references to democracy out of policy documents has also become the norm in the meetings 
between EU and Tunisian officials as well (ibid., p.210). This was confirmed by a 
Commission official who admitted that non-security related political issues tend instead to be 
addressed only in informal settings, such as ‘post-meeting dinners’, and are generally kept 
off of the official meeting agenda.13 Thus, with democracy not only increasingly omitted 
from policy documents related to Tunisia, but also disappearing from the ENP socialization 
frameworks, it becomes difficult to imagine the actual practical effect of socialization. That 
is, considering that socialization is a “method that relies upon repeated referencing of the 
values and norms intended to be diffused,” how can it be expected to promote democracy 
when all references to it cease to exist entirely (ibid).  
The cases illustrate the priority given to the EU’s geostrategic and partner countries’ 
political interests; and a preference for what Youngs calls ‘reform support with caveats’ 
(2006b).  The structure of the APs points to a notoriously superficial use of the concepts of 
democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental freedoms, and reforms; all of 
which are used seemingly interchangeably (Del Sarto et al., 2011, p.935, 940). While the 
inclusion of partners in the negotiating process enhances co-ownership, the obvious 
implication is a downgrade of the democratization agenda and a dilution of the political 
content in the bilaterally negotiated ENP APs. Where references remain, they tend to be 
vague and selective, undermining any such efforts at promoting democracy. Ultimately, the 
evidence suggests that the partnership-building approach seems not to have succeeded in 
‘socialising’ the Moroccan and Tunisian counterparts through persuasion; rather it is 
characterized by indulgence or, some would say, ‘connivance with a non-democratic regime’ 
(Balfour & Missiroli 2007, as cited in Echangüe 2008). 
                                                
13 Author’s interview, Brussels, July 2006. As cited in Powel 2007, p. 210. 
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Soft Security: The ‘Single Issue’ Syndrome 
As for the EU’s approach to more specific policy issues, the strategic logic holds that 
“democracy should help maintain and perpetuate diplomatic gains made in relation to 
particular short-term security objectives” (Youngs, 2010, p. 5). In practice, however, “in 
dealing with individual issues of concern, the EU’s policy is to negotiate trade-offs and deals 
on the particular matter in question in a way that deliberately keeps the democracy agenda 
separate” (ibid.). This is what Youngs refers to as the EU’s ‘single-issue syndrome’. 
Illustrative examples include energy security, climate change, and the management of 
migration. The following case study analyzes the EU’s external migration policy and 
examines implementation dynamics of EU-Moroccan cooperation in this regard. 
EU External Migration Policy in Morocco 
Since the 9/11, Madrid and London terrorist attacks, immigration has come to be 
explicitly linked to global terrorism. Illegal immigration from the South is now a top priority 
on the EU security agenda, particularly in Morocco. According to Young (2010) most 
European politicians would rank the management of migration, especially illegal or irregular 
migration flows into Europe, as representing a more immediate ‘security threat’ than 
traditional, ‘hard’ strategic questions (p. 6). The priority attributed to irregular migration is 
confirmed in the European Security Strategy, which lists ‘illegal migrants’ among the ‘key 
threats’ facing the Union (Council, 2003, p. 4) based on the perception that they could also 
be the ‘transmission trains of violent ideologies of conflict” from the MENA region into 
Europe (Joffé, 2008, p. 159).   
The overall aim of EU migration policy towards Mediterranean partners is to enforce 
stronger control measures and to reduce migratory pressure on EU borders (Wunderlich 
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2010, p. 254). 14  The dominant EU approaches are restrictive policy and control measures, 
capacity-building and alignment to international conventions with tentative cooperation on 
the side regarding legal migration and the ‘migration-development nexus’ (Wunderlich, 
2010, p. 255).  In Morocco, policy-makers designate priority status to the aim of stemming 
illegal immigration from and through Morocco. In the ENP AP with Morocco, the priority 
action referring to the issue of migration is:  […]	   effective	   management	   of	   migration	   flows,	   including	   the	   signing	   of	   a	  readmission	   agreement	  with	   the	   European	   Community	   (EC),	   and	   facilitating	   the	  movement	  of	  persons	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  acquis,	  particularly	  by	  examining	  the	  possibilities	   for	   relaxing	   the	   formalities	   for	   certain	   jointly	   agreed	   categories	   of	  persons	  to	  obtain	  short-­‐stay	  visas.	  (EU/Morocco	  AP,	  p.	  4).	  
 
It is widely agreed by academics that the content of these measures is consistently 
security-oriented, supported by the fact that, despite the emphasis placed on the synergies 
between migration and development, EU expenditure is overwhelmingly focused on control 
measures15 (Paoletti, 2011). Furthermore, the EU has been rather proactive in the application 
of ‘migration conditionality’.  Franz Eder (2011) argues, “the linkage of migration and 
border security with economic conditionality has been particularly striking.” (p. 441). This 
entails the application of its massive economic leverage to pressure the countries of the 
Maghreb to better control their borders and manage migration flows (ibid). This tendency is 
all the more noteworthy when one considers the Union’s ‘substantial unwillingness’ to exert 
the same kind of pressure in the name of democratization (ibid, 441-442).  
                                                
14 Policies normally regarded as central to the EU’s external dimension include: migration missions to develop a 
dialogue on migration with third-country authorities; circular migration; readmission agreements; and 
collaboration between police authorities on both sides of the Mediterranean. See also E. Paoletti, p. 293. 
 
15 For an in-depth list of projects funded under the AENAS Programme in Morocco, see Appendix, Table 8 in 
A. Kirchner. 2010. ‘The external dimension of the EU’s immigration policy.’ Available 
http://essay.utwente.nl/60300/1/BSc_A_Kirchner.pdf.  
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On the other hand, European policy documents insist that support for more open 
politics in developing states is a central pillar of EU’s immigration-reducing strategy, while 
expanding projects on border control migration have been presented as ‘democracy 
promotion’ (Youngs, 2009, p.911).  The claim is that this cuts across democracy support, 
although as Youngs points out, “invariably without a clear notion of why a less authoritarian 
system would contradict this objective.” (Youngs, 2009, p. 911). Regardless of these claims, 
Youngs contends that democratization is, if anything, feared as a possible trigger of greater, 
not reduced, illegal migration. Furthermore, “Southern European states frequently make the 
case for exercising greater caution in pushing political reform in North Africa because they 
receive more migrants from this region than do northern EU member states.” (2010, p. 6). 
However, if they were truly committed to the democratic rhetoric, Youngs continues, “their 
geographical proximity to North Africa should give them greater, not lesser, reason to see 
democracy prevail in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt” (ibid).   
In a study of the differentiation and convergence dynamics of cooperation initiatives in 
the area of migration policy, D. Wundelich (2010) uses examples from implementation of 
EU policy in Morocco to demonstrate the importance of bilateral relations between 
individual member and non-member states. Spanish-Moroccan relations are particularly 
crucial in this regard. The first plans on an EU border management project with Morocco 
were initiated in the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2002-2004 with a MEDA budget 
of €40 million. The project was finally agreed with the Moroccan authorities in 2004 with the 
aim to provide new equipment and training for the Interior Ministry. The project was halted 
due to disagreements over monitoring and control over the project (Wunderlich, p. 264). The 
project only regained momentum in the wake of the 2005 crisis at Ceuta and Melilla, and as a 
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result of growing Moroccan concerns about immigration. However, Wunderlich shows that 
cooperation with the EU “was not unconditional and require substantial EU incentives.” 
(p.265). The revised MEDA project entailed an additional €27 million and employed a sector 
approach which enable the Moroccan Interior Ministry to use the overall budget of € 67 
million according “to its own priorities, on any border section and apparently without 
Commission monitoring on the use of the money.  
Two important implications to this cooperation: First, the considerable funding 
allocated to the Moroccan Interior Ministry strengthened this position and re-emphasized its 
securitized vision of migration in the policy field (Wunderlich, 2010, p. 265). Moreover, in 
the face of stern opposition, European actors were quick to concede in order to achieve 
cooperate at all: Most notably, “the EU stepped back from its monitoring requirements…and 
its ideas about an integrated perspective on migration issues in order to achieve cooperation.”  
(ibid). Furthermore, while the broad focus on migration remained unchanged, “Moroccan 
actors engaged with the EU agenda largely following their own conditions to respond to 
externalities of European integration that turn transit migration into immigration to 
Morocco.” (ibid). Finally, the criticism is frequently launched that European concession and 
the loosening of control entails “adverse effects on policy convergence by undermining those 
parts of the EU external migration package that focus on human rights and international 
commitments such as the protection of refugees and asylum seekers.” (Ibid, 268).  
This example illustrative of the EU’s willingness to concede to the demands of its 
partner states, and abandon the promotion of democratic governance (principles) whenever 
they threatened to interfere with the prosecution of the migration security agenda – or if 
overall cooperation more broadly.   
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Counter-terrorism and de-radicalization 
The third logic linking democracy and security strategies relates to the notion that 
“democratic reform is the best means of tempering the radicalization that underpins 
international terrorism” (Youngs 2010, p. 7). Following the September 11th , Madrid (2004) 
and London (2005) terrorist attacks, more and more European voices drew a direct link 
between terrorism and political repressive regimes. Moreover, given the geographical 
proximity and the transnational nature of Islamic terrorism, the EU became increasingly 
aware of the importance of international cooperation with third countries, as stated in the EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy (EUCTS) adopted in 2005:  Given	  that	  the	  current	  international	  terrorist	  threat	  affects	  and	  has	  roots	  in	  many	  parts	   of	   the	   world	   beyond	   the	   EU,	   co-­‐operation	   with	   and	   the	   provision	   of	  assistance	  to	  priority	  third	  countries	  –	  including	  North	  Africa,	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  South	  East	  Asia	   –	  will	   be	   vital.	   Finally,	  working	   to	   resolve	   conflicts	   and	  promote	  good	  governance	  and	  democracy	  will	  be	  essential	  elements	  of	  the	  Strategy,	  as	  part	  of	   the	  dialogue	  and	  alliance	  between	  cultures,	   faiths	  and	  civilizations,	   in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  motivational	  and	  structural	  factors	  underpinning	  radicalization.16	  	  
 
As part and parcel of this new overall strategy, the European Council simultaneously 
adopted the Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism17 (SCRRT), 
thus confirming that radicalization had become one of the central threads in Europe’s 
counter-terrorism approach. A consensus of experts believes that the emergence of Maghrebi 
terrorism was caused by a lack of democracy and economic stagnation. This view is 
supported by Franz Eder who divides the factors responsible for transforming the Maghreb 
region into a  ‘breeding ground’ for radicalization and recruitment into frustration with 
political participation – specifically political participation of Islamist parties – on the one 
                                                
16 Presidency and CT Coordinator (2005) The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Doc 14469/4/05 REV , Brussels 
30 November, p. 7. As cited in Durac & Cavatorta, 2009, p. 17. 
 
17 Council of the European Union (2005) The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism, 14781/1/05 REV1, Brussels, 24 November 2005. 
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side, and socio-economic stagnation on the other (2011, p. 437-438). To tackle these causes, 
EU counter-terrorism cooperation is said to focus its activities around two main axis: “to 
build counter-terrorism capacity building in third countries so as to deepen the international 
commitment to the fight against terrorism and to address the factors that contribute to the 
support and recruitment of terrorists” (Martins, 2010, p. 25). At least at the discursive level, 
democracy is considered an essential element in the fight against the root causes of terrorism 
and radicalization.  
Notwithstanding official recognition of the causal role played by the region’s 
authoritarian ally regions in creating and reinforcing the conditions which give rise to 
radicalization, there is a growing feeling that the EU has remained reluctant to push for 
substantive structural political reform throughout this region (Youngs, 2010). Rather, Eder 
argues, instead of tackling the root causes of terrorist activity and radicalization in the region, 
cooperation has tended to be focused on a short-term status-quo oriented containment 
strategy: “Such a strategy, in the eyes of the EU, reduces the threat to Europe to an 
acceptable level. At the same time, this strategy does not imperil its economic and energy 
interests in states such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya” (2011, p. 432).   
The democratization-stability dilemma in counter-terrorism policy and its impact on 
democracy promotion can be explained by two factors: pre-existing stability in a potentially 
unstable environment; and the fear of ‘Islamisation’ and the Algerian experience (Eder, 
2011). As regards the former, the strategic logic sees the countries in the Maghreb in 
particular – including Tunisia and Morocco – as doing “a ‘good’ job when it comes to 
tackling the excesses of transnational terrorism: “They are effective and provide a sufficient 
level of stability for the needs of the EU” (ibid, 444). Second, the fear of ‘Islamisation’ and 
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the Algerian experience have had a massive influence on the strategic thinking of the Union. 
In this regard, two dynamics should distinguished. The first relates to the fear that the 
transition of regimes from autocracies to Western-styled democracies involves the risk of 
destabilization, which in turn may jeopardize other European interests in the region (ibid). 
Thus, quick transition poses a real threat to short-term stability. The second dimension relates 
to the fear that “free elections and an open political could contribute to the rise of anti-
Western groups and endanger EU’s security and economic interests. Such a result would not 
only challenge regional stability but also Western interests in the region” (ibid). From this 
perspective, it is therefore seen to be reasonable for the Union to balance this potential threat 
by forming alliances with the current regimes and helping them consolidate their power 
(ibid).  
The following case studies illustrate the way in which democracy and security 
objectives interact with short-term stability interests in the context of EU counter-terrorism 
policies to produce a logic that favors strategic containment over proactive efforts to attack 
the underlying political causes of instability. 
Why rock the boat? The Tunisian experience 
The various incarnations of political Islam in Tunisia have regularly been suppressed 
by the authorities to the point that Islamists in Tunisia have virtually disappeared as a 
coherent political force following government clampdowns in the 1990s18 (Powel, 2007). 
Cooperation between the EU and Tunisia in this domain was initiated following the 9/11 
attacks within the framework of the ENP AP.  The main thrust of EU-Tunisia counter-
                                                
18 Tunisia is notable for the exclusion of its Islamists as a means of containing radicalism. Despite a brief respite 
following Bin Ali’s takeover of the Tunisian presidency in 1987, the Nahda party was hounded with such 
vigour by the security forces in the 1980s and 1990s that its leadership is now either in exile, in prison, or 
executed. 
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terrorism cooperation, as in most southern Neighbourhood states, has focused more on 
technical capacity building exercises, such as modernization of policing, and increasing 
international cooperation in the domain of law enforcement and border surveillance 
(Watanabe 2011).  Lisa Watanabe insists that while these measures are certainly valuable in 
terms of supporting the efforts of Maghreb countries to reduce the operational space of 
terrorist organizations within their territories and to meet international legal obligations in 
relation to tackling terrorism, “there has been little effort to address the root causes of 
terrorism and to develop a more holistic approach to counter-terrorism cooperation within the 
context of the ENP” (p. 5). Rather, Tunisian officials are keen to emphasize how Tunisia and 
the EU share a common threat in political Islam and a responsibility to ‘fight terror’ (Powel 
2007, p. 205). Thus both actors have displayed a willingness to securitize their policies, 
establishing security and stability as their primary policy goals (Powel 2007, p. 211).  
The case of EU-Tunisia counter-terrorism cooperation supports the claim that, in the 
broader context of European foreign policy, democracy policy represents at best a secondary 
goal after the more pressing objective of security of European citizens (Powel, 2009b). In 
addition, democratization is not pursued more seriously due to the status quo orientation 
resulting out of the democratization-stability dilemma in relation to counter-terrorism. Two 
factors explain this. For one, Tunisia generally does a ‘good’ job when it comes to tackling 
the excesses of transnational terrorism. From the perspective of European needs and interests, 
the regime is effective and provides a sufficient level of stability (Eder, 2011; Powel, 2009b). 
Secondly, “with no obvious signs that the current system in Tunisia provides the space for 
anti-western extremism to flourish, there is no pressing need for a review of policies that 
might change this environment” (Powel, 2009b, 70-71).  Thus, while democracy may be seen 
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to be an effective weapon against terrorism, “existing authoritarian governments offer an 
equally effective, immediate and proven short-term response” (ibid). Moreover, it is not seen 
to be worth opening up the political space and risking the threat to European interests that 
would accompany the coming to power of a less cooperative regime. The existence of 
security in the area of counter-terrorism in Tunisia, therefore “appears to have pushed 
democracy off the agenda for the foreseeable future: Bin Ali's government has achieved a 
level of stability and security sufficient for the EU without the need for democracy” (ibid). In 
response then to calls for greater engagement with the democratization process in Tunisia, 
both the EU might ask: why rock the boat? (Powel 2009b).  
Security and the Anti-Islamist Bias: The case of Moderate Islam in Morocco  
As argued by Viñas (2009), the EU’s relationship with moderate Islamism presents 
one of the most striking examples of its contradictions and dilemmas (p,16). One aspect of 
this is the problem of policy ambiguity, which, according to Joffé (2008) “relates to the 
question of European support for democratic governance and the difficulty that the 
Union…has had in developing a meaningful and appropriate policy towards the phenomenon 
of political Islam” (p. 161). This stems from the fact that the EU continues to see these 
movements as having equivocal relations with terrorism and democratic values, and to pose a 
threat to current stability (Emerson & Youngs, 2007). Meanwhile, European rhetoric 
increasingly and routinely insists that Islamists must play a full political role if real 
democratic transitions are to happen in the region (Youngs, 2010, p. 8). Thus, “a progressive 
securitization of political Islam as part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategies has coincided 
with the EU’s first attempts to reach out to moderate Islamists (Bicchi & Marti 2006). 
Moderate Islamism is thus caught in the middle of the two extremes of the democracy-
stability dilemma” (Andrés Viñas, 2009, p. 16).  
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European engagement, in particular direct engagement with Islamist opposition 
parties and movements in the region vary significantly depending on the context of the 
national setting. In Morocco, for instance, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) is a 
legal, recognized political actor with parliamentary representation and fairly regular and 
unproblematic contact with European diplomats (Kausch et al., 2009, p. 968). Because of the 
relatively liberal environment in Morocco, European embassies have also been able to 
establish occasional contact with illegal, yet non-violent Islamist movements, foremost of 
which foremost of which is the widely-supported Justice and Charity (JC) organization. Yet 
according Kausch and Youngs, “expressions of displeasure from the regime have led to 
greater diffidence on the part of European governments” (2009, p. 968).    
EU ambiguity is also frequently evident in its relations with the PJD: With the PJD 
having been predicted to form part of the government after the September 2007 elections, 
many European governments embarked on some cautious but constant engagement. 
Following the elections, numerous observers “raised suspicions about electoral engineering 
in the face of the surprisingly weak results of the PJD, which did not gain the place in 
government that polls had universally predicted it was well on course to attain.” (Kausch et 
al., p. 970).  Meanwhile, European reactions to the elections were highly positive. The low 
voter turnout reflecting popular dissatisfaction was disregarded and the EU praised the 
Moroccan government for the election’s transparency and for admitting the first ever 
delegation of international election observes. In the end, the “PJD’s failure to get into 
government provoked an almost audible sigh of relief on the northern shores of the 
Mediterranean” (ibid.).   
 IV. The Arab Spring  
Seven years after its creation, the ENP is reviewed. European Commission’s (EC) 
services undertook the process in late 2010, but as the unemployed graduate Mohamed 
Bouazizi set himself on fire, sparking a latent revolt against poor socioeconomic 
conditions across the region, what was supposed to be a treadmill exercised turned into 
a very challenging one: that of quickly devising a policy response towards a 
Neighbourhood undergoing sudden, rapid and profound transformations. (Ayadi & 
Gadi, 2012, pp. 1) 
 
Over the past year, the shortcomings within the EU’s security policy towards its 
Neighbouring south have dramatically come to the fore, thus challenging many of the 
assumptions upon which international policies towards the region were based (Balfour, 
2012). For instance, the logic of equating political stability in North Africa and the Middle 
East and the subsequent containment of security risks, such as terrorism and the 
radicalization of political Islam, emigration and socio-economic upheaval was discredited. 
Likewise, the assumption the belief that pursuing economic liberalization would lead to a 
degree of political reform within the framework provided by authoritarian style regimes was 
also shattered by the mobilization of protesters “demanding not just bread and butter but also 
dignity and freedom of expression” (Balfour, 2012, p. 28).  
After waffling between first supporting the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt and then 
the uprising against Qaddafi, the EU has officially acknowledged that its status quo policies 
were, quite simply, wrong (ibid). As stated by High Representative/Vice President Catherine 
Ashton (2011), the EU ought to promote instead “sustainable stability”, i.e., stability 
achieved through change, rather than immobilism, towards sustainable political, social and 
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economic development.19 The Arab Spring thus highlighted the need for the EU to pressure 
more for domestic reform in the south, a commitment that was made but never heeded by the 
ENP (Tocci, 2011). 
In March and May the Commission produced two Communications that outlined the 
EU’s approach in dealing with the Arab Spring as well as the main points for a renewal of 
Euro-Mediterranean relations based largely on a review of the ENP. The first one, A 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean 
(Commission & HR, 2011a), outlines a series of emergency measures to cope with the 
exceptional events in the region; while the second one, A New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood. A Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Commission & HR, 
2011b), unveils a broad medium and long-term approach to Euro-Mediterranean relations.  
According to these documents, the EU has built its revised policies towards the MENA 
countries around four pillars: refined conditionality, greater differentiation among countries, 
new tools to support democracy-building, and a stronger focus on sustainable socio-
economic development (Balfour, 2012). From these two Communcations a number of new or 
revised positive featues of a revamped ENP can be identified (Tocci et al., 2011).  It is 
argued that, while many of the initiatives proposed are certainly welcome and can potentially 
bring benefits for the Southern Neighbours, most of them remain ill-conceived at present, too 
shy, short-term without a long-term strategic vision of the EU’s future position in the region. 
As a result, the reform of the ENP does not appear to represent a qualititative change in 
approach or way of thinking toward towards the southern Neighbouring region (Echangüe, 
2012). 
                                                
19 C. Ashton, “A world built on cooperation, sovereignty, democracy and stability”, speech 11/126 of 25 
February 2011. 
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Steps forward in the Review 
On paper external actor support seems adequate for the immediate challenges facing 
the region, but much will hinge on how this support is targeted and delivered (Echangüe, 
2012).  
More Aid: ‘3 Ms’ 
First, the EU recognizes the need to offer more benefits to the neighbours (Tocci 
2011). The incentives on offer boil down to what the EU calls the ‘three Ms’ – ‘more money, 
more market access, more mobility’.20 As for the ‘more money’ component, aid in the 
current financial cycle (2011-2013) is expected to rise by €1.2 billion on top of the €5.2 
billion already budgeted for grant support for the period, in support for economic and social 
development, by improving business environments, and conducting private projects on 
agriculture and rural development21 (Tocci 2011, p.9). Greater resources are also to be 
committed to political reform through the Governance Facility, the Comprehensive 
Institution Building (CIBs) programme, and the new Civil Society Facility within the ENPI 
(ibid.).  
On 26 September, the European Commission adopted a new package of grant support 
for the region.22 It includes: A new programme, ‘SPRING’ (Support for Partnership, Reform 
and Inclusive Growth), was put in place to organize additional financial resources of €350 
                                                
20 European Commission – Press Release. EU response to the Arab Spring: new package of support for North 
Africa and Middle East. IP/2011/1083, Brussels 27 September 2011.  
 
21 These figures are in addition to the first and immediate financial response to provide humanitarian aid: as of 
the date of this press release, €80.5 million to support the refugee crisis in North Africa. In its budget proposals 
for the period 2014-2020 (announced on 7 December) the Commission proposed to allocate more than €18.1 bn 
to support the 16 partner countries of the ENP. This would represent a substantial increase (by approximately 
40%) compared to the financial support of the period 2007-2013. The new European Neighbourhood Instrument 
(ENI) will enable to provide this assistance in a faster and more flexible way, allowing for increased 
differentiation and incentives for best performers in line with the principle of "more for more". See, 
Commission - Press Release. EU Response to the ‘Arab Spring’. MEMO/11/918, Brussels, 16 December 2011. 
 
22 Commision - Press Release. EU Response to the Arab Spring: the SPRING Programme. MEMO/2011/636, 
Brussels 27 September 2011.  
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million for 2011- 2012; the creation of a Civil Society Facility (CSF),	   with	   an	   overall	  budget	   of	   €26.4	   million	   for	   2011;	   an allocation of nearly €30 million for 2011-2012 
academic cycle specifically for the Southern Neighbourhood.23 
The second component, ‘more market access’, includes the offer to the south of 
“Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements” (DCFTAs), which reportedly pave the 
way to delivering on the ENPs never kept promise of a “stake in the single market” for the 
neighbours.24 On 14 December 2011, the Commission announced the decision to open trade 
negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, as soon as the necessary preparatory 
process is completed.25  
Finally, in addition to the aforementioned increase in aid allocated to financing 
scholarships under the Erasmus programme, more benefits also include mobility partnerships 
and visa liberalization. Mobility partnerships anticipate the circular migration of semi-skilled 
workers to one or more EU member states, in return for the third countries’ commitment to 
respect EU conditions related both to domestic reform and, more importantly, readmission 
agreements and border controls. In return, the EU would offer via facilitation for students, 
researchers and business people beginning with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia (Tocci, 2011). 
“Mobility Partnerships” have been initiated with Tunisia and Morocco already in October 
2011.There are over 740 additional Erasmus Mundus mobility grants for academic exchange 
with Southern Mediterranean countries this academic year. And a further 80 million euros 
has been allocated for ENP countries in 2012 and 2013 for these scholarships. 
                                                
23 This represents a doubling of the allocation originally foreseen for the Southern Neighbourhood. See 
Commission Press Release. Erasmus Mundus: funding boost for Arab Spring, IP/11/1558, Brussels, 16 
December 2011.  
 
24 MEMO/11/918. 
 
25 Commission – Press Release. EU agrees to start trade negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. 
IP/11/1545, Brussels, 14 December 2011.  
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“More for More” 
Branded with ‘more for more’, the EU acknowledges the imperative engaging in 
conditionality. The ‘more for more’ slogan means precisely this: “the EU is willing to offer 
more benefits in return for more progress on reform by the neighbours” (Tocci, 2011, p. 9). 
In recognition of the policy’s misplaced and disproven assumption, the EU has also shifted 
its attention to identifying ways to promote ‘deep democracy’ and focusing efforts towards 
giving civil society a stronger role in national and international politics (Balfour 2012, p.31). 
The Commission explicitly states that funding and aid allocations is to be conditioned to the 
reform performance of the partners. To that end, reform is interpreted in terms of ‘deep 
democracy’, meaning	  the	  kind	  of	  democracy	  that	   lasts	  because	  alongside	  elections,	   it	   foresees	  the	  protection	  of	   rights	  and	   freedoms,	   functioning	   institutions,	   good	  governance,	  rule	   of	   law,	   checks	   and	   balances,	   the	   fight	   against	   corruption,	   effective	   law	  enforcement	  and	   security	   sector	   reform”	  Reform	   is	   also	   interpreted	   in	   economic	  and	   social	   terms:	   promoting	   inclusive	   economic	   development,	   tackling	  inequalities,	   creating	   jobs	   and	   ensuring	   higher	   living	   standards.	   Finally,	   the	  Commission	  has	  not	  limited	  itself	  to	  asserting	  the	  need	  for	  positive	  conditionality.	  It	  has	  also	  accepted	  that	  a	  logical	  corollary	  of	   ‘more	  for	  more’	  is	   ‘less	  for	  less’,	   i.e.	  negative	  conditionality.	  (Tocci,	  2011,	  p.	  9).	  	  
 
In this regard, several elements are advanced to support the emergence of deep 
democracies in the EU’s Neighbourhood. Together with a reinforcement of human rights 
dialogues, two new cooperation instruments will be created: a European Endowment for 
Democracy (EED) and a Civil Society Facility (CSF)26. The EED is to be created as an 
independent body with the capacity to respond to funding requests more flexibly and rapidly 
than existing EU instruments, and would allow the EU to support political parties, non- 
registered NGOs and actors including, at least in theory, faith-based groups. As Balfour 
(2012) notes, if the EED lives up to these commitments, “it would represent a significant 
                                                
26 EU Response to the Arab Spring: the Civil Society Facility. MEMO/11/638,  
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departure from the EU’s traditional non-partisanship in relating to political dynamics in third 
countries” (p. 31). This is certainly a step in the right direction because it implies the 
inclusion of hitherto excluded political parties and movements. In this regard, the recent 
sweeping electoral victories of the Islamist parties – Tunisia’s Ennahda and Morocco’s 
Justice and Development Party (PJD) – have become the first Islamist parties ever to form 
governments in their countries, and will be the first test for reportedly new mentality towards 
political Islamism (Kausch, 2012). These changes, and the EU’s response to them, will be 
crucially decisive for determining the future trajectory and role for the EU in the post-Arab 
Spring context.  All	  in	  all,	  this emphasis on engagement does not represent a significant departure from 
previous EU policy, which as Balfour (2012) points out, has increasingly favored finding 
paths of cooperation with partner governments (p. 30). The difference, at least on paper, is 
that democratic commitments appear stronger conditions participating in the framework, and 
in particular for receiving the benefits on offer (ibid.). Nevertheless, and despite public shows 
of repentance by the EU for its prior support for the ruling autocrats, Echangüe (2012) argues 
that actual changes in terms of policy and instruments do not reflect a qualitative change of 
paradigm: “There is still a tendency to ignore the root causes in favour of treating symptoms 
and to adopt functionalist approaches to aid” (Echangüe 2012).  
Limitations and Continuities 
More benefits coupled with more conditionality and differentiation represents a 
positive step in the right direction. However, several preliminary shortcomings can also be 
identified. In the early days of the Arab Spring there were many calls from member states for 
‘Marshall Plans’ (Balfour, 2012, p. 31; Echangüe, 2012) for North Africa and the Middle 
East entailing breaking down trade protectionism. No such proposals have yet materialized. 
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As a result, Balfour argues, the problems ahead are likely to face the same obstacles that have 
constrained previous policies: “delivery on the part of the member states” (ibid).  
Ambiguous Formulations, Elusive Aims 
The prospects of effective conditionality remain hindered by the continued vagueness 
of the ENP conditions: While proclaiming the principles of conditionality and ‘more for 
more’, Tocci is skeptical of the fact that very little guidance has been provided regarding how 
to make these concepts operational. For instance, Tocci asks: “How precisely is the EU to 
benchmark and monitor its conditions? How will new instruments, such as the Endowment 
for Democracy, provide added value rather than duplicate existing EU instruments such as 
the Governance Facility and the EIDHR?” (2011, p. 10). So far, there has been little 
clarification or guidance to answer these questions. 
The EED in particular can been criticized on the grounds that there are no indications 
on how the endowment would specifically function, which institution would be responsible 
for its management, and on the specific initiatives it would undertake, beyond the broadly 
defined ones outlined in the Communication (Ayadi & Gadi, 2011, p. 9). Ayadi and Gadi 
(2012), the CSF’s mandate is even blurrier (ibid.). Describing its activities, the 
Communication A New Response to a changing Neighbourhood identifies the objective of 
‘helping CSOs to develop their advocacy capacity’, as well as ‘their ability to monitor reform 
and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes’ (Commission, 2011b, p. 4). 
These activities, they argue, are already undertaken by the EIDHR, thus raising the concern 
about a possible duplication of actions between the two instruments (Ayadi et al., p. 9-10). 
Furthermore, they highlight the fact that the only indication given by the Communication is 
that ‘inter-country delegations will seek to bring countries’ governments and civil society 
together in a structured dialogue on key areas of […] cooperation” (p. 4). It is argued that if 
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such a framework might work for the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood, “it neglects the fact that 
in the Arab Mediterranean an important number of CSOs have been co-opted by local 
regimes, which in the current situation raises questions about their independence and degree 
of commitment towards genuine democratization” (Ayadi et al, p. 10). Furthermore, and 
perhaps most crucially, the functioning of this facility as outlined in the Communication 
“point[s] at a reinforcement of the EU’s cooperative approach towards democracy promotion, 
whereby emphasis is put on institutionalizing relations between CSOs, local governments 
and EU structures (ibid p. 11). In the absence of an emerging and functioning civil society, 
the act of institutionalizing relations points to the probability that governments will continue 
to co-opt civil society, effectively ensuring that cooperation in this domain does not alter the 
status quo in any significant way.  
Migration and mobility: Security-oriented  
A second limitation relates to the continuance of a security-driven logic in certain 
policy areas, which could hinder the practical value of the benefits being offered (Tocci, 
2011). For one, the EU has proposed mobility partnerships as one of its benefits on offer to 
the neighbours. Despite traditional member state reluctance, the EU is demonstrating much 
greater readiness to negotiate on trade and mobility issues.  The importance assigned to the 
EU’s objectives of managing population movements and demographic change in its 
migration programmes is reiterated in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM).27 While the renewed global approach is broader than the previous one in different 
fields, Pascouau (2012) similarly questions “whether this new framework will reach the 
objective in terms of enhanced mobility for people living in the Arab Region” (p. 58). 
                                                
27 The Communication takes stock of what has been achieved so far and adapts it in order to respond to 
forthcoming challenges in a changing environment.  
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While certainly welcome, Tocci argues the logic of the proposed mobility 
partnerships remains highly security driven, thus putting into question its overall value (p. 
10). In line with the Pascouau’s reservations above, the neighbours are offered limited 
mobility 28  only if they comply with a host of strict security requirements regarding 
readmission and border controls. Nathalie Tocci (2011) argues:  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  and	  when	  the	  third	  countries	  acquire	  the	  capability	  to	  enforce	  such	  requirements,	   their	   level	  of	   internal	  development	  and	  stability	   is	  often	  such	  that	  their	  potential	  for	  emigration	  has	  been	  largely	  depleted.29	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	   cost	   of	   implementing	   the	   EU’s	   requirements	   is	   such	   that	   the	   reward	   of	  temporary	   mobility	   for	   a	   limited	   category	   of	   citizens	   is	   often	   not	   worth	   the	  bargain.	   This	   is	   all	   the	   more	   true	   in	   a	   country	   like	   Tunisia,	   which	   may	   be	  tentatively	   moving	   towards	   greater	   sustainability	   and	   therefore	   in	   which	  authorities	  will	  become	  more	  accountable	  to	  citizens	  and	  less	  willing	  to	  play	  along	  with	  the	  EU’s	  securitised	  migration	  policy	  tune.	  (Tocci,	  2011,	  p.	  10).	  
 
It is too early to judge whether external actors will suffer from short-termism or 
commit for the long haul. Certainly the funds committed are not substantial enough to 
constitute a ‘Marshall plan’ type of approach as was suggested by some actors at the 
beginning of the transitions (Echangue 2012). On the other hand, offering more ‘money, 
markets and mobility’ is only part of the equation. As Youngs (2011) put it: “it does not 
constitute a geostrategic response to such potentially momentous events…the EU must move 
beyond its ‘bureaucratic mindset’ to develop a geostrategic vision of where it wants to be in 
the 2030” (p. 3). 
                                                
28 Tocci notes that the bulk of circular migration takes place spontaneously and not through regulated schemes 
of mobility partnerships. Remarks by Anna Triandafyllidou, European University Institute, 22 June 2011, 
referenced in N. Tocci , ‘State (un)Sustainability,’ (2012), p. 10, note 8.  
 
29 Remarks by Anna Triandafyllidou, European University Institute, 22 June 2011, referenced in ibid., p. 10, 
note 9.  
 V. Conclusion 
This thesis argued that the EU’s approach to achieving security of European interests 
is crucially determined by the specific interaction dynamics between democracy and the 
threat this objective has on short-term stability interests with respect to the specific security 
concerns involved. These are seen to vary across the different areas of security concern – 
with democracy seen to be a destabilizing force – either directly or indirectly – to European 
security interests, and as such, is systematically relegated to the backseat when the two 
conflict. In the ENP framework, these interests are shown to be in constant conflict, crucially 
hindering the democratization agenda in the southern Neighbourhood. The EU’s tendency 
toward a status-quo oriented strategy is a result of the democratization-stability dilemma and 
the specific domestic contexts within which the EU is engaged. As a result, and 
notwithstanding all the normative rhetoric, the EU’s democratization agenda takes a back 
seat in the EU’s relations with the region even when there exists good logic for promoting 
political reform as a means of ensuring long-term security. This, again, is explained by the 
irreconcilable conflict between the dual pursuit of long- and short-term security objectives by 
means of conflicting security logics.  
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